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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from an order entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah, on January 23, 1990; an Order of Dismissal denying McClellan's request 
to file a cross claim and third party claims entered December 27, 1991; and an Order denying 
McClellan's Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered on 
January 17, 1992. Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 and Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the pleadings finding McClellan 
personally liable on a promissory note when his answer clearly raised the defense that the note 
was signed only in his corporate capacity? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Question of law reviewed 
for correctness. Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; St. Benedict's Div. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Ut. 1991). 
2. Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the pleadings when McClellan, 
in a specific affidavit, pointed to discoverable evidence he had not been given an opportunity to 
obtain that would establish his defense? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: St. Benedict's Div. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Ut. 1991). 
3. Did the District Court err in denying McClellan's request to set aside judgment 
when the undisputed evidence showed that Plaintiff had violated the one action rule by failing to 
preserve and foreclose a real estate mortgage securing the debt? STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Question of law reviewed for correctness. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Barber v. 
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Farmer's Ins. Exchange 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1988). 
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow McClellan to amend 
his answer and assert a cross claim against a co-defendant who signed the same note in the 
same manner as McClellan when no trial date had been established, no discovery cutoff had been 
established and no motion cutoff had been established? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of 
discretion. Rule 13, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Girard v. Appleby 660 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1983). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-38-1 provides: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter, [requiring exhaustion of remedies against security] 
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 12(c) provides: 
After the Pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 13(f) provides: 
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against 
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein 
or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the original 
action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against 
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of the claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 15 provides: 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any 
2 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party 
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10 days after 
service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, 
unless the court otherwise orders. 
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 54(b) provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is 
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any 
order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added) 
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential 
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from the default of Callistoga Corporation ("Callistoga") on a loan 
made to Callistoga by Horizon Savings and Loan. [Record 2] Mountain America took over 
Horizon Savings and Loan after it went into receivership. [Record 2] The loan was made on June 
5,1984, and total payment on the loan was due on September 9,1984. [Record 4] The loan was 
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secured by real property located in Cedar City, Utah. [Record 142] The loan was evidenced by 
a promissory note signed by officers of Callistoga: Randy Hoyt, President, and Robert E. 
McClellan, Secretary. [Record 4] Both Hoyt and McClellan signed the promissory note a second 
time as officers of the corporation. [Record 4] A factual inquiry by the court into the purpose of 
the second signature has never been conducted. [Trans. Dec. 3, 1991 p. 8] 
Mountain America brought an action on July 20, 1989, against Hoyt and McClellan, 
as co-defendants, seeking recovery based on the theory that they were personal guarantor's of 
the loan.1 [Record 2] McClellan answered the complaint on September 12, 1989, admitted 
signing the note, but asserted that his signing of the note "was in his capacity as the secretary 
of the Callistoga Court Club, Inc." [Record 9, 10] McClellan also pled as an affirmative defense 
that "Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a liability for a Promissory Note which is a corporate liability not 
a personal liability, and the Defendant Robert E. McClellan is being sued personally." [Record 9] 
On November 6, 1989, Mountain America filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings asserting that McClellan's answer "does not deny the debt alleged... nor does it state 
other legal defenses to Plaintiff's claim." [Record 15] Without a hearing, the district court entered 
an order in favor of Mountain America on January 23, 1990. [Record 41] 
Hoyt filed a motion to dismiss on September 6, 1989. [Record 7]. Notwithstanding Hoyt's motion, 
Mountain America then sought, and the court granted, a default judgment against Hoyt. [Record 29] Hoyt 
then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the court granted. [Record 89] Although the court 
set aside the default judgment, Hoyt remained before the court and Mountain America was provided the 
opportunity to bring an action against him. [Record 89] That Hoyt was a party to the underlying action was 
made clear when the Utah Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by McClellan because Hoyt was still 
a defendant before the trial court. [Record 108] Neither Hoyt nor Mountain America took further action in 
the case until McClellan sought to bring a cross-claim against Hoyt based on the fact that if McClellan had 
any liability on the note, Hoyt had the exact same liability. [Record 111] Hoyt then moved to have 
Mountain America's claim against him dismissed and to have McClellan's cross claim denied. [Record 134] 
Mountain America did not oppose Hoyt's motion. The court dismissed Hoyt, without prejudice. [Record 
176]. 
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Mountain America garnished McClellan's bank account and initiated supplemental 
proceedings to collect on the Judgment in late August 1990. [Record 54-57] It was then that 
McClellan found out for the first time that the Judgment had been entered. [Record 60] Proper 
notice of judgment pursuant to rule 58A was not served. [Record 43, 56, 62, 83] He then filed 
for a protective order and brought a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. As part of this motion, 
McClellan's counsel, James Shumate, filed an affidavit stating he had important evidence that 
controverted Mountain America's claim.2 [Record 81] The evidence that Shumate presented 
regarded Hoyt's recollection of the signing of the promissory note. [Record 81-83] Shumate 
averred that Hoyt informed him that the "second set of signatures on the Promissory Note were 
placed there by himself and Mr. McClellan and that they were placed there at the direction of the 
officers of Horizon Thrift and were not to represent a personal liability on the note." [Record 83] 
With that information, McClellan moved the court to set aside the Judgment. [Record 74] 
At the hearing on the motion held on October 2, 1990, Counsel for Mountain 
America stated for the first time that Mountain America based its Motion of November 1989 on 
an answer to a request for admission. [Trans. 10] There is nothing in the record to support 
counsel's assertion. Not in the motion, not in the memorandum in support of the motion, nor 
anywhere else since the motion was decided without oral argument. [Record 15-17] In fact, the 
Motion filed, contrary to the assertions made by Mountain America's counsel, was captioned as 
a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, not a motion for Summary Judgment. [Record 15] The 
2
. In the affidavit, Shumate stated that he was unaware prior to August 1990 that Hoyt was represented 
by counsel and had been served in this case. [Record 82] He also stated that Mountain America had failed 
to provide the co-defendants copies of pleadings that had been filed against the other defendant. [Record 
82] Thus, both parties were unaware that the other was involved in the proceeding. [Trans. Oct. 2, 1990 
Hearing p. 15] 
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substance of the motion and the supporting memorandum was that there were no controverted 
facts on the pleadings and therefore judgment was proper3 Nor does the order of the court 
dated January include a reference to the admission [Record 1 Ill] 
As noted above, prior to the hearing on October 2, 1990, McClellan's attorney filed 
an affid 
of Horizon First Thrift had informed him and McClellan that their signatures did not create personal 
liability. [necL * ... jpen court that he had been unable to secure an affidavit 
of Hoyt at that time. [Trans. Hearing Oct 2, 1990 p.8] The district court denied McClellan's 
motion to set aside the judgment. [Record 89] The trial court found that there was no admissible 
evidence to support McClellan's claim that there was i mo personal liability 
October 2, 1990 p. 13] Although the trial court recognized that from the face of the note it could 
fc mi i j i II: ,i 11 ii | i n mi mi "in in 1II mi I ' l i i i i i si1 i l l III in 
accept the proffer of evidence made in Shumate's affidavit that Hoyt would testify that the bank 
officers signatures did i lot create persoi lal liability. [ rrans. Hearing October 
2, 1990 p. 13] Nor did the court allow additional time to procure an affidavit of Hoyt to support 
the assertion made in Shumate's affidavit. 
McClellan filed II 11II || IIII m II Hall '" ii i| >i ei i it < i in rt 
dismissed the appeal because defendant Hoyt was still before the district court, and therefore 
3
 * * •*• entire u-xi of the Motion for Judgment is as follows: 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and moves the court for judgment against Defendant Robert E. McClellan 
in the principal sum of $40192.63, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees as appropriate, pursuant 
to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the Answer does not deny the debt and 
no genuine issue as to a material fact remains to be tried. 
Plaintiff requests that the court rule on this Motion without oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Ri lies of Practice. 
I 
there was no appealable final judgment. [Record 108] 
In November 1991, McClellan's counsel was informed by Mountain America, for the 
first time, that the loan to Callistoga had been secured by real property. [Record 142] Because 
Hoyt was still before the trial court, and there had been no motion or discovery cut-off, McClellan 
new counsel that the loan was secured by real property. [Record 138] Specifically McClellan 
niiiniuil Hit1 iiJLiiimiII 1  ii.'cuii IIIIUMI lllllii iiiliilui uluiy |inli|i m lent against McClellan because Mountain m 
America had taken no steps to exhaust the real property collateral prior to seeking recovery on 
the promissory note iii violation of Utah's one-action [Record 138] Mountain America 
responded to the motion foi reconsideration by stating without any evidence that a foreclosure 
by a first trust deed holder "foreclosed out the interest of [Mountain America] before the instant 
statement was false because the trust deed that was foreclosed had a later recording date than 
Muu >i in itaii in :!l in i i Ei in iiiicci v i IIK III in Dldei [I tecoi ell 
179-180] McClellan filed an affidavit and exhibits to support this argument [Record 181] Without 
a hearing and without stating the basis for its decision, the district court denied ycQellan's Motion 
to Reconsider. [Record 220] No decision was made on which lienholder had first priority. 
Contemporaneous with the Motion to Set Aside, McClellan filed a cross-claim against 
signed the exact document in the same manner. [Record 121] He also sought to bring third 
party complaints against Callistoga < \t HI | H HI aii HI HI, I  i Iward Burgess, Jen y Il II „»utz ar id Charles Bess 
all of whom where shareholders in Callistoga. [Record . , .j ,«**,. oral argument on the motion, 
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the district court denied McClel lan's mot ion without prejudice stating that any claim against Hoyt 
could be brought in a separate proceeding, [ j r ans . Hearing on Dec. 3, 1991 p I4 | McClellan 
appeals f rom the original January 23, 1990 interlocutory judgment, the order of dismissal entered 
December 27, 1991, and the denial of the mot ion to reconsider entered January 17 1992 
V:1 SUMMARY OF i HE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Mountain America 's Motion 
fc In id(|i lie!1! il r; r i III i< • II leadings is i ily appropriate 
where there is no disputed facts on the face of the pleadings. Where the pleadings present 
controverted issues of fact, Judgment on the Pleadings is inappropriate — the pleadings 
show that there was a factual issue whether McClellan signed personally u . I U I C I i u i e . 
If, in examining a mot ion for judgment on the pleadings, a court looks beyond the 
the parties with notice of its intention. The policy behind the rule allows the non-moving party the 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found that the affidavit submit ted by 
McClellan's attorney did not controvert Mountain America's claim that McClellan had admitted that 
he signed personally on the note. Under Rule 56(f) an attorney's proffer of what will be uncovered 
during discovery is sufficient to preclude judgment until discovery can be completed. 
The trial coi irt abi ised its discretion when it denier! f"> Hi < H I . mi i iiri inln mi i b i nnonsider 
based on newly revealed evidence from Mountain America that the loan was secured with real 
before the trial court established that the loan made to Callistoga was secured with real property 
in Iron County, Utah. Although Mountain America argues that it was a junior lienholder, the facts 
show that it failed to allege its junior lienholder status and prove that the foreclosure by the first 
lienholdn llhiiiil rixliiiiiislipul illim1 in ill pi i if H m II, inllHtfi-il It ninii IIII IIIIIIUI In Inmlui t , Illlbir- i . i 
requirement in Utah prior to bringing an action on a promissory note secured by real property. 
In addition, 
position. Although there was a deed of trust foreclosed that had an earlier execution date, that 
deed of trust was recorded after Mountain America had recorded its deed if tri ist Thus 
Mountain America had a priority position. When the other party foreclosed on the property 
Mountain America failed to take action to protect its position as the first lienholder in the collateral. 
Ii i II 111. ill in, belli ire nn I I I I IHI In .atisly ti iiki-niill I I I I i In. HI HIII it is • i>< mum II by nnil | II I >| M-'I I, rii-ni In 
brought against a debtor, the party seeking to recover on the loan must exhaust the collateral. 
As part of that requirement, the lienholder has an obligation to protect its interest in the collateral-
Mountain America failed to do so. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused McClellan the opportunity to 
amend Ins rinswi'i In im.luilt1 n moss IIMIMI ri(|Hinsl Orients, 
especially when there is no trial date set or motion or discovery cut-offs and the other party is not 
prejudiced IIII ould seei i i especially appropriate here \ merely attempted 
to bring a cross-claim against a co-defendant that was aware of the underlying claim ^._ 
therefore not prejudiced in any respect. Allowing an amendment to join a party is especially 
appropriate when doing so will avoid injustice occasioned by the potential of inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions. 
y 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
WHEN MCCLELLAN'S ANSWER CLEARLY CONTROVERTED FACTS MATERIAL 
TO MOUNTAIN AMERICA'S CLAIM. 
Thougl i the II iislrirl Komi's IriniiHiy Zl IMMIIUIIIHI suggest - -
response to a motion for summary judgment, it in fact was entered in response to Mountain 
America's motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) and decided without 
oral argument. [Record 15.] 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by the Plaintiff to ferret out legally 
insufficient defenses is governed by the same standards, as. a motion II > illisiiiiiiisfi, uiiilei Mule 
12(b)(6) brought by the Defendant in response to a legally flawed complaint. Crooked Lake Dev., 
to state a claim and the Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings are different sides of the 
same coin. 
In review f i * muuoi t, mc ^oui t oil Appeals is obliged to coi istrue tl le 
allegations of the answer in the light most favorable to the Defendant and to indulge all reasonable 
The Defendant can win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if the Plaintiff could prove no set of facts in 
suppor I: • »1 II l i s < l a i n i See Colman v. Utal 1 State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622 HI III II11 flIIII II likewise, I!HE 
Plaintiff can prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if i IO set of facts could be 
proved by Defendant that would constitute a valid defense. 5A Wright & Miller Federal Practice 
and Procedure k 1 168 at MR in (1199(11. 
, j 
When McClellan's answer is viewed in this light, the District Court's grant of the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings must be reversed. 
In response to Mountain America's allegation that "Defendants executed and 
delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note or installment loan agreement," [Complaint f 2, Record 2] 
loan agreement, but affirmatively asserts that his execution of that agreement was in his capacity 
as the secretary of the callistoga Court Club, Inc. (Emphasis adldkxJ) [Ar iswui • - .. || 
Further, the answer asserted: 
"Second Defense Plaintiff's complaint asserts a liability for a promissory note which 
is a corporate liability not personal liability, and Defendant Robert E. McClellan is 
being sued personally " [Answer P 1 Record 9] 
It is a defense to liability on a promissory note that the signer was signing only as 
is so basic as to hardly require stating our agreement with defendants' argument that the 
corporate entity is separate from themselves as individuals dn busir ies^ |i i 
it will protect them from personal liability therefore.") rherefore, it was error for the court to grant 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
L. IF THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS. 
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE MCCLELLAN WAS NOT GIVEN 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE, 
The record demonstrates that prior to entry of the January 23, 1990 order, nothing 
outside the pleadings was presented to the court in support of the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.4 It was not until the hearing on McClellan's motion to set aside judgment that 
Mountain America suggested, for the first time, that the order might be supported by McClellan's 
answer to a request for admission.5 
Under Rule 12(c) "if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." McClellan was denied this opportunity. 
(i) McClellan was given no notice that matters outside the pleadings would be 
considered. 
McClellan was not given any notice that matters outside the pleadings would be 
considered by the court. He, along with the court, learned for the first time that Mountain America 
was relying on the request for admission at the hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment. 
The courts are consistent in reversing judgments that rely on matters outside the pleadings where 
An affidavit of a Mr. Kevin Stevenson was submitted by Mountain America [Record 19] but it was solely 
addressed to the amount of interest and principle due on the note and did not address the merits of the 
claim or whether Defendants had signed only in their corporate capacities on the note. 
At the hearing on the motion to set aside judgment, Mountain America's lawyer incorrectly 
represented to the court that its motion for judgment on the pleadings had been based on an answer to a 
request for admission, [transcript of hearing dated October 2,1990 at 10]. However, the record is clear that 
the request for admission was not mentioned in any pleadings filed with the court prior to January 23,1990, 
and the motion was decided without oral argument. [Record 15; 17; 35] 
5Contrary to Mountain America's assertion, the answer to the request for admission does not establish 
any personal liability on McClellan's part. The request establishes, at most, that McClellan personally 
delivered the note and was personally present when the note was signed by him as secretary of the 
corporation. The full text of the Request is: 
Request No. 1: Admit that on or about the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed 
and delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as 
secretary of the corporation Callistoga Court Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto. [Record 22] 
The request says nothing about whether McClellan was agreeing to personal liability when signing the note. 
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adequate notice of intent to do so is not given to the party opposing the motion. Securities Credit 
Corp. v. Willey 265 P.2d 422 (Ut. 1953) (reversing trial court because party opposing judgment 
on the pleadings was not accorded the opportunity to controvert interrogatory answers included 
in motion for judgment on the pleadings): Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah 561 P.2d 
191, 193 (Ut. 1977) ("It is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present pertinent material.") 
Moreover, it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that all parties were 
given a reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if matters outside the 
pleadings are considered. Bekins Bar V. Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assn 587 P.2d 151 (Ut. 
1978). Here the record shows the opposite, that McClellan was not given an opportunity to 
present pertinent material. 
(ii) Despite his affidavit, showing that evidence was discoverable that would 
establish his defense. McClellan was not given an opportunity to pursue that 
discovery. 
Prior to the hearing on the motion to set aside judgment, McClellan's lawyer 
provided the court with his affidavit stating that he had spoken to Mr. Hoyt, the other corporate 
officer who had signed the note with Mr. McClellan, who informed him: 
"that there should have been no judgment issued against either 
himself or Mr. McClellan because they had signed the promissory note 
in question solely as officers of the corporate maker of the note, 
Callistoga Court Club. 
Mr. Hoyt also informed me that the second set of signatures on the 
promissory note were placed there by himself and Mr. McClellan and 
that they were placed there at the direction of the officers of Horizon 
Thrift and were not to represent a personal liability on the note." 
[Record 83] 
At the hearing, McClellan's counsel informed the court that he had been unable to 
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obtain an affidavit from Mr. Hoyt. [Transcript of hearing dated October 2, 1990 at 8]. The court 
rejected McClellan's affidavit on Mountain America's objection that it contained hearsay and 
denied the motion to set aside judgment on the ground there was no evidence in the record to 
support McClellan's defense: 
"THE COURT: Why did he sign it? 
MR. SHUMATE: As a corporate officer. And he was instructed to sign it by Mr. 
Froyd. That's as much as I can tell Your Honor, because that's what I'm told. 
MR. KENT: But that's inadmissible, and we have not even an Affidavit from Mr. 
McClellan that says that. 
THE COURT: No, we don't. And that's the reason I granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
It seems to me that although the note may read that the makers are described 
above, if you - if the officers of the corporation sign it in their corporate designation and also in 
their individual capacity, they are agreeing to be liable on the note. 
And I - I find no other factual basis - or no other basis in the record for any other 
explanation of why they signed the note, other than they were agreeing to be responsible for it. 
And that's why I granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, and that is still the ruling that I'm 
going to hold to. 
Transcript of hearing dated October 2, 1992 at 12-13. 
The problem with the court's ruling is that it afforded McClellan no opportunity, as 
is required by Rule 12(c), to present the obviously pertinent material that a bank officer had 
instructed Mr. Hoyt and Mr. McClellan to sign the note a second time and that the signature would 
not result in personal liability. 
(iii) The affidavit of James L. Shumate should at least have been treated as a 
Rule 56(f) affidavit and McClellan should have been granted an opportunity 
to do discovery on the issues. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a party the opportunity to avoid judgment 
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when there are important facts that are yet to be uncovered through discovery. The Rule provides 
that n[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Utah 
R. Civ. Pro. 56(f). The rule is intended to prevent a court from making a decision where the party 
opposing the motion for judgment has been unable to adequately present its evidence in 
opposition to the motion for judgment. Without this procedure, there is a "danger of founding 
judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of the facts. . . . " Strand v. Associated 
Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d at 194. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that motions under Rule 56(f) should be liberally 
treated. Strand. 561 P.2d 191, 194-95 (Utah 1984). It has also held that an important factor to 
be considered is whether the evidence sought is specific, rather than merely a request to conduct 
a "fishing expedition" in discovery. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 313 (Utah 1984). The trial court 
should also determine whether the non-moving party has had an opportunity to controvert the 
assertions made by the party seeking judgment through the discovery process. Jd ; Strand. 561 
P.2d at 194. 
In both Strand and Cox, the Utah Supreme Court found that the refusal to allow 
additional discovery based on the affidavit was an abuse of discretion. Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 
311, 315 (Utah 1987) Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191, 194 
(Utah 1977). In reaching these decisions, the Court stressed that the information that was sought 
was specific and that discovery had not yet been completed. 
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Similarly, in this case, McClellan's attorney, in his affidavit and at argument before 
the court, asserted that specific evidence was available through further discovery and that it would 
controvert Mountain America's basis for summary judgment. At the hearing, McClellan's attorney 
reiterated this position that: 
"at the time of the execution of the note, the additional signatures were 
put on there at the instruction of Mr. Froyd of Horizon Thrift, who was 
the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, and that those signatures were 
not intended to be personal guarantees." 
Transcript Hearing of October 3, 1990 at p. 6 
and indicated that he was unable to "get a hold of Mr. Hoyt to get an Affidavit signed." [Trans. 
Hearing Oct. 3, 1990 p.8] 
Although technically Shumate's affidavit and statement in court is not in the form of 
a Rule 56(f) affidavit, it is the functional equivalent of such an affidavit. The Affidavit clearly puts 
the court on notice that there is evidence that specifically contradicts Mountain America's position 
and that extra time and discovery would allow McClellan to establish that fact. The fact that the 
affidavit is not labeled a Rule 56(f) affidavit is not a fatal flaw. The Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that it will be controlled by the substance of the pleadings, not the captions that are 
used to describe the contents. See e.g.. Gallardo v. Bolinder. 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990); 
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983). In addressing this very 
issue, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an affidavit that was not properly labeled as a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit, would be considered as such because the "substance of the affidavit suggests it was 
intended to be [a rule 56(f) affidavit]." Downtown Athletic Club. 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 n.2 (Ut. 
1987). 
There was evidence available that upon further discovery would have specifically 
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controverted Mountain America's claim that McClellan was personally liable on the note. That 
evidence was brought to the court's attention through Mr. Shumate's very specific affidavit which 
should not have been ignored by the court. This matter should be remanded to the district court 
to allow McClellan to obtain the evidence from Hoyt and to conduct further discovery from the 
officer of the Horizon First Thrift, Mr. Froyd. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECONSIDER THE 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER ENTERED AGAINST MCCLELLAN WHEN THE RECORD 
SHOWED THAT MOUNTAIN AMERICA FAILED TO EXHAUST REAL PROPERTY 
COLLATERAL THAT SECURED THE LOAN PRIOR TO FILING SUIT AGAINST THE 
SIGNERS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
The trial court erred in refusing to reconsider the judgment, even though a final 
judgment had not been entered, when presented with evidence that would preclude Mountain 
America from recovering against McClellan6. 
Mountain America brought this action against Hoyt and McClellan as alleged makers 
of the Callistoga note, without first attempting to exhaust the real property collateral that secured 
the loan. Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin dated November 11, 1991 [Record 142] The issue came to 
the court's attention when McClellan's counsel filed a motion to reconsider on November 11, 
1991. [Record 138] Along with the motion, McClellan's counsel filed an affidavit wherein he 
asserted that he had learned of the real property security arrangement from Mountain America's 
6Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion to reconsider, by 
implication Rule 54(b) allows such a motion in cases involving multiple parties. See Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Const. Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Utah courts, as well as others, have 
noted on a number of occasions that it is proper for a trial court to review a decision and change its 
decision prior to its final entry. See e.g. Bennionv. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985)(citing McCollum 
v. Clothier. 121 Utah 311, 320, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952): Chapman v. Jesco. Inc.. 98 N.M. 707, 709, 652 
P.2d 257, 259 (1982): Johnson v. Whitman. 1 Wash.App. 540, 541, 463 P.2d 207, 209 (1969)): Williams v. 
Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1988) J., Zimmerman, concurring in result: see also In re Blalock. 233 N.C 
493, 64 S.E.2d 848, 858 (1951): McKee v. William. 741 P.2d 978, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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counsel for the first time on November 7,1991. [Record 142] In all its pleadings, the Plaintiff had 
failed to inform the court or Defendant that the note had been secured by real estate. 
Utah has adopted a one-action rule in cases where loans are secured with real 
property. See D. Milner. Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action" Rule in Action. 1991 Utah L 
Rev. 557, 557. The Rule provides: "There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provision of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1. 
The one-action rule requires the creditor to exhaust the real property collateral prior 
to taking any action to collect on the loan. In the words of the Court in First Nat'l Bank of 
Coalville v. Boley. 90 Utah 341, 61 P.2d 621, 623 (1936): "Under [the one-action rule] there is no 
personal liability on the part of mortgagor until after foreclosure or sale of the security and then 
only for the deficiency then remaining unpaid; a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment 
against the mortgagor until the security has first been exhausted. That position has been 
reaffirmed in a number of subsequent decisions. See e.g.. Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty Co.. 
657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, in this case, because Mountain America failed to take any action against the 
property, it is precluded from taking action against the signers of the note, as a matter of law. 
A. Mountain America cannot claim the junior lienholder exception to the one 
action rule. 
In opposition to McClellan's motion to reconsider, Mountain America appears to 
have taken the position that this case fits within an exception to the one-action rule as found in 
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan. 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936), although no reference to 
the exception is made in Mountain America's motion. In Cache Valley, the Court found that where 
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the position of the secured party was that of a junior creditor there was no need to bring an action 
on the property, if the senior creditor had already exhausted the collateral. Jd. at 1049 (emphasis 
added). 
However, the Court has strictly limited the scope of the exception and created 
important, required burdens of pleading and proof before the exception applies. In Lockhart Co. 
v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333,1336 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that prior 
to claiming a junior lienholder exception the lienholder had to make a "proper allegation and proof 
. . . that the security has become valueless." Jd. If the junior lienholder does not make an 
adequate showing that the collateral is without value, the lienholder "is precluded by the 'one-
action rule' from pursuing his action on the note." Jd. Here, Mountain America has failed to show 
anything in the record where it has alleged or proved the exhaustion of the collateral. Indeed, 
there is no evidence in the record that the property had been foreclosed on and that it was 
without value. In fact, McClellan was not aware of the security's continued existence until 
Mountain America's new attorney informed him of the security in late 1991. Without the allegation 
and the proof that the property was valueless, Mountain America's action against McClellan must 
be dismissed as a matter of law. 
B. Mountain America was not in fact a junior lienholder but was in first position 
and let the collateral slip through its hands. 
Mountain America's lienholder position was in fact that of a senior creditor. [Affidavit 
of Blake S. Atkin in Support of McClellan's Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment dated 
December 4, 1991, Record 181]. Mountain America erroneously assumed that Zion's First 
National Bank had a priority lien against the property. However, Zion's deed of trust contained 
an erroneous description of the property. And although Zion's received its deed first in time, it 
19 
was filed incorrectly. Mountain America then recorded its deed of trust correctly. Sometime after 
Mountain America recorded its deed, Zion's corrected the error in the title description. [Affidavit 
of Blake S. Atkin dated December 4,1991 at 5 3. Record 181] However, because Utah is a race-
notice jurisdiction for the purpose of recording of property deeds, the first trust deed to be 
properly recorded has priority even though it may have been granted subsequent in time. See 
Utah Code Ann. S57-3-3: Neeley v. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, (Utah 1979): Kemp v. Zion's First Nat'l 
Bank. 470 P.2d 390, (Utah 1970). Thus, Mountain America's trust deed has priority over the trust 
deed foreclosed by Zion's. 
Zion's recognized this legal principal in the trustees deed it issued at the foreclosure. 
The trustees deed states: "Whereas Callistoga Court Club by deed of trust dated March 8,1984 
and recorded February 19, 1988..." [Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin dated December 4, 1991, Exhibit 
B, Record 188]. Thus, even Zion's conceded its priority date to be February 19,1988, some four 
years after Mountain America's trust deed was recorded. 
Thus Mountain America failed or neglected to protect its interest in the collateral and 
to foreclose on its priority position precluding its claim under the one action rule. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW 
MCCLELLAN TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE A CROSS CLAIM AGAINST 
HOYT AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS. 
McClellan attempted to amend his answer to include a cross claim against Hoyt who 
was already a party to the proceeding and to receive leave of court to file third party complaints 
against non-parties who were shareholders of Callistoga. Because the trial court has discretion 
whether to allow an amendment to the pleadings, this Court reviews the trial court's action under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13(f) authorizes a party to plead a "cross-claim . . . 
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
original transaction..." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 13(f). Rule 15 provides that "a party may amend his [or 
her] pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 15. As a general proposition, the rule 
tends to favor granting a leave to amend a pleading. See e.g.. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch.. 
663 P.2d 93, (Utah 1983). In determining when an amendment is proper, the court's primary 
consideration is whether a party has an opportunity to defend against the claim and whether any 
party receives an unfair advantage by the amendment. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 
455 (Utah 1983). Courts are much less likely to grant an amendment when the amendment will 
delay the adjudication of the case. See Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); Hein's 
Turkey Hatcheries. Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant. Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (Utah 
1970). 
Here, there was no reason for the trial court to deny McClellan's motion for leave 
to amend and bring a cross-claim against Hoyt. There was no trial date established, no discovery 
cutoff established and no motion cutoff established. Second, Hoyt was not prejudiced in any way. 
Hoyt's liability, if any, is predicated on the exact facts and documents as McClellan's. In that 
regard, Hoyt knew of the issues and was prepared to defend against them. Any defense that 
Hoyt had prepared against Mountain America would be equally effective against McClellan. Third, 
joining Hoyt might well have prevented another trip before the court in another lawsuit based on 
contribution. Finally, without the cross-claim, there is a possibility that McClellan will be forced to 
bear an unfair burden of the judgment, in the event this Court rules against him. It is likely that 
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Hoyt will assert claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel against McClellan in any suit for a 
right of contribution. Even if McClellan can successfully defeat these claims, he will have suffered 
through the emotional turmoil of another set of judicial proceedings, not to mention the additional 
litigation expenses. In short, the refusal to allow the motion to amend to include a cross-claim will 
only increase the costs to the litigants and subject McClellan to the possibility of inconsistent 
judgments on the same facts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court's January 23,1990 judgment, its December 27, 
1991 order denying McClellan's motion to reconsider, and denying McClellan's request to file a 
cross claim and third party claims, should be reversed and this case remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1992. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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